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ABSTRACT 
Safeguarding  tropical  rainforests  is  one  of  the  most  important  challenges  for  the  future, 
particularly  to  mitigate  climate  change.  The  international  community  has  actively  sought 
international  policy  solutions  to  curb  deforestation  in  tropical  countries.  Debt-for-nature 
swaps and certification of sustainable forest management have been implemented by NGOs. 
Some states are currently negotiating the implementation of the REDD (Reduced Emissions 
from  Deforestation  and  Degradation)  mechanism,  a  North-South  financial  transfer  to 
compensate countries for avoided deforestation. However, little is known about the efficiency 
of these instruments. We argue that they may have a double effect: an expected direct impact 
on deforestation linked to the conditionalities of instruments, and an indirect impact due to 
their  feedback  effects  on  macroeconomic  variables,  affecting  in  turn  the  drivers  of 
deforestation. The second effect is often overlooked by policy makers. The objective of the 
paper  is  to  disentangle  the  two  effects  for  different  categories  of  forest  countries.  We 
conducted a panel data analysis for the period 1990-2005 and show that cluster analysis of 
tropical forest countries would be more relevant if it were based on relative forest endowment. 
On the basis of econometric results, we can recommend differentiating policy instruments 
according  to  the  relative  forest  abundance  of  each  country.  Debt  reduction  programs 
contribute to the reduction of deforestation in all countries. Countries with abundant forests 
are locked in a development pathway based on overexploitation of their forests making them  
less  responsive  to  incentive  measures.  In  countries  with  average  forest  endowment,  we 
recommend output-based REDD, whereas in countries with low forest cover, either input-
based or output-based REDD mechanisms should be efficient.  
1.  Introduction 
Tropical deforestation is not a recent phenomenon but has become a growing concern in 
recent years because of its global environmental impacts. Between 1990 and 2005, l forest 
area decreased by  an average of 13 million  hectares  per  year (excluding  reforested  area) Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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(FAO, 2005), with major consequences for climate and biodiversity. Deforestation is now the 
second  leading  cause  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  just  behind  industrial  emissions. 
Moreover, since 50 to 90% of the world‟s species are sheltered in tropical forests (WCED, 
1987), deforestation also contributes to the acceleration of biodiversity losses. 
Although tropical forests are mostly located in low income countries, developed countries are 
aware that deforestation is a global problem and that a “laissez-faire” policy will jeopardize 
the future of the planet and their own development paths. The international community is thus 
actively looking for global solutions and is trying to identify policy instruments that could 
persuade tropical countries to curb their deforestation. Deforestation is  mainly due to the 
expansion of arable land, the need of local populations for fuelwood (Chomitz, 2007), and the 
country‟s dependence on foreign exchange earnings: trade in tropical timber and export crops, 
at the expense of forest conservation, is often the easiest and most accessible way to respond 
to these economic pressures. Developing countries are consequently not prepared to reduce 
their deforestation activities without compensation. They argue that a global solution to the 
deforestation issue must include a North-South transfer scheme to compensate for the revenue 
foregone,  as  well  as  for  their  costly  efforts  towards  monitoring  and  controlling  the 
exploitation  of  their  forests  –  often  in  a  context  of  illegal  logging  by  local  and  foreign 
corporations, and corruption.  
Various international mechanisms have been tested in the past and new proposals such as the 
REDD
1  scheme are currently on the negotiation table. These m ay be trade measures for 
tropical timber or North-South payments, either to finance the costs of forest conservation 
policies  in  deforesting  countries;  or  to  remunerate  avoided  deforestation.  These 
compensations can be monetary transfers, debt relief, or the award of tradable emission rights 
reflecting the CO2 emissions saved through avoided deforestation.  
These policy instruments are likely to have a double impact on deforestation: a direct impact 
linked to the conditionality of transfers and the direct consequences of trade interventions on 
the price of timber, and an indirect impact due to their potential feedback effects on economic 
variables  which  are  themselves  drivers  of  deforestation,  such  as  urban  and  rural  income, 
poverty rates, agricultural productivity, and foreign exchange earnings. These effects -which 
are often overlooked in policy-making discussions- can either reinforce the direct impact, or 
                                                 
1 Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
3 
 
attenuate it, therefore reducing the longer term efficiency of international instruments to limit 
deforestation. 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  explore  the  relative  capacity  of  international  policy 
instruments to curb the global rate of deforestation: we conducted a country-level panel data 
analysis of the main drivers of deforestation, which in turn,  helps forecast the direct and 
indirect  impacts  of  policy  instruments  proposed  by  the  international  community.  For 
econometric estimations we used a data base that covers the period 1990-2005, allowing us to 
capture the most recent deforestation dynamics. In contrast with other available studies that 
often  provide  estimations  per  continent,  we  reveal  that  cluster  analysis  would  be  more 
relevant if it were based on the relative forest endowment of countries. We demonstrate that 
policy instruments such as expansion of protected areas and agricultural modernization will 
affect countries differently, depending on their relative forest cover. We also show that North-
South compensation transfers can have perverse effects by indirectly creating new incentives 
to deforest. Debt relief appears to be the only policy that is efficient for all types of countries.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  provide  a  historical  review  and  a 
description of international policy instruments to limit deforestation. In section 3 we present 
the  data  and  model  specifications.  In  section  4  we  analyze  our  results  and  make 
recommendations concerning the adequacy of international policy instruments with respect to 
the  characteristics of the countries concerned. 
2.  International policy instruments to reduce deforestation 
2.1.  Historical review  
Although genuine multilateral negotiation only started at the 11
th Conference of Parties (Cop) 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Montreal in 2005 with a 
proposal for a new North-South transfer mechanism to reduce emissions due to degradation 
and deforestation (REDD), the international community has been aware of the deforestation 
issue since the late 1970s and several policies have already been tested with mixed success. 
As early as the 1970s, developed countries pressed the South to implement sustainable forest 
management. However, developing countries, grouped in G77, demanded that a global forest 
fund be created to finance “opportunity costs foregone”, arguing that developed countries 
shared  responsibility  in  tropical  deforestation  through  their  unsustainable  consumption  of 
tropical forest products (Humphreys, 2008 ). But developed countries rejected this proposal 
and despite renewed efforts, all “international forest negotiations (...) failed to resolve the Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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issues of finance and technology to the satisfaction of developing countries” (Humphreys 
2008). The 1992 Rio Summit successfully launched the Framework Conventions on climate 
change and on biological diversity, but negotiations on forest management again failed to 
reach  a  consensus.  Five  years  later,  the  Kyoto  protocol  only  succeeded  in  including 
afforestation and reforestation in the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), as projects for 
the  reduction  of  emissions  in  developing  countries.  But  it  left  aside  the  crucial  issue  of 
deforestation. 
In the face of blocked multilateral negotiations, self-supporting initiatives emerged: the most 
well-known are the debt-for-nature swaps initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 
1984, to enable developing countries to reduce their debt while increasing their budget for 
conservation activities. NGOs negotiated the reduction of the debt of developing countries 
with international banks outside international official agreements, and in return developing 
countries  committed  themselves  to  an  environmental  conservation  agreement.  Another 
initiative by NGOs is the Forest Stewardship Council (FFC), which promotes timber product 
certifications to stop illegal trade which “dwarfs legal production in some countries” (FAO 
and ITTO, 2005) and to promote sustainable forest management. Some countries have also 
invested in bilateral agreements: for instance in 1998, the United States enacted the “Tropical 
Forest Conservation Act” (TFCA) to "offer eligible developing countries options to relieve 
certain official debt owed the U.S. while at the same time generating funds to support local 
tropical forest conservation activities” (US Department of State website)
2. Moreover, outside 
actual international negotiations or current bilateral agreements, developing countries have 
proposed  “groundbreaking  deals”  to  some  developed  countries  to  protect  rainforest.  For 
example in 2007, the government of Ecuador declared it was ready to renounce exploiting the 
oil resources located under Yasuni National Park if the international community compensated 
the loss of revenues
3, while the same year, Guyana offered Britain the management of one 
million acres of rainforest in exchange for financial transfers
4. 
                                                 
2  Six  countries  currently  have  TFCA  agreements:  Bangladesh,  Belize,  El  Salvador,  Panama,  Peru,  and  the 
Philippines. These agreements, which were adopted between 2002 and 2004, generate $70 million for tropical 
forest conservation in these countries, and are designed to improve sustainable forest conservation as scientific 
and  managerial  capacities.  For  instance,  the  Republic  of  Philippines  obtained  $8  million  over  14  years  to 
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In 2005, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal for a multilateral REDD 
policy:  countries  that  agree  to  reduce  their  deforestation  and  forest  degradation  below  a 
baseline would be entitled to compensation from developed countries, either in the form of 
monetary transfers or through tradable allowances in proportion to avoided deforestation. This 
proposal  endorses  for  the  first  time  that  idea  that  forests  should  be  considered  both  by 
developing  countries  and  developed  countries  as  a  global  public  good  and  that  the 
participation of all countries should be sought. After a preliminary examination of the REDD 
proposal, international negotiations on avoided deforestation resumed in 2007 at the 13th 
COP to the UNFCC in Bali, which focused on the urgent need to mitigate the impact of 
deforestation on climate change. However, no consensus has yet been reached on the best 
mechanism  and  payment  rules.  There  is  disagreement  among  the  group  of  developing 
countries, according to their capacity to reduce deforestation, and among developed countries.  
Two broad approaches for REDD are currently under examination. One, the “input-based” 
option,  seeks  to  manage  the  drivers  of  deforestation  by  paying  countries  that  adopt 
deforestation  mitigation  policies.  The  other,  the  output-based  option,  pays  countries  once 
results in terms of avoided deforestation (either at national or at project level) can be observed 
and certified. The advantage of the first option is that deforestation levels do not need to be 
measured  and  that  developed  countries  can  to  some  extent  impose  their  preferred  anti-
deforestation strategies on deforesting countries. The latter option guarantees that the target of 
avoided deforestation is reached before payments are made. However, unless payments are 
scheduled over a long time span or unless a specific mechanism is set up to sanction countries 
that defer deforestation activities only to resume them after payments have stopped, there is a 
risk REDD gains in terms of avoided deforestation will only be temporary (this is called the 
permanence  issue).  Another  risk  associated  with  the  REDD  mechanisms  is  leakage,  the 
translocation  of  deforestation  activities  to  areas  outside  the  abatement  area,  leading  to 
intensified deforestation either in other regions of the same country or in third countries that 
are not part of the REDD system.  
Together with the increasing awareness that the implementation of REDD could involve very 
large North-South transfers –beyond current ODA flows – these drawbacks have led a number 
of developed countries to adopt a cautious attitude and to examine alternative approaches to 
the deforestation problem.  For example, the European Union (EU), which also  wishes  to 
protect its new carbon market, is promoting other solutions, such as measures to reduce illegal 
logging and illegal trade of forest timber and products, and certification programs. Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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2.2.  Synergy effects of international policy instruments 
This history of negotiations shows that several types of international instruments have been 
envisaged to try to curb the global rate of deforestation. Five broad types of instruments can 
be distinguished: (i) trade instruments that sanction illegal logging; (ii) forest stewardship 
certification,  with  the  expectation  that  certified  products  will  meet  a  greater  international 
demand and reach a higher price than non-certified products; (iii) debt-for-nature swaps; (iv) 
input-based REDD payments and (v) output-based REDD payments. The net effects of these 
policy instruments are not straightforward. As shown in table 1, the direct impacts are linked 
to  the  way  instruments  and  conditionalities  are  designed.  However  these  international 
instruments  have  indirect  longer  term  impacts  on  macroeconomic  variables  of  recipient 
countries and on the structure of incentives. If massive payments are made, they will increase 
net national income. They may improve the investment capacity of rural communities – if the 
money received trickles down to them – or the investment capacity of the state. They may 
contribute to greater foreign exchange earnings and to debt alleviation. However, the effects 
of  these  macroeconomic  changes  on  deforestation  are  less  predictable.  They  can  either 
reinforce the initial effort towards reducing deforestation, or mitigate it. 
For instance, the macroeconomic optimization model of Kahn and McDonald (1995) reveals 
that in order to pay back their debt, developing countries tend to adopt short term policies that 
work against conservation. These authors demonstrate theoretically that debt-for-nature swaps 
have double positive synergy effects on deforestation, because they impose the creation of 
conservation areas by agreement, and simultaneously relieve the pressure of debt. In a similar 
way, we argue that the net effect of incentive transfers on forest area can either be positive or 
negative depending on the way they indirectly affect drivers of deforestation. For example, 
large REDD transfers can actually relieve pressure on forest resources if they are allocated to 
poverty alleviation programs in rural forested area (Karsenty, 2008). However, these funds 
can also be used to promote activities that compete with forest cover, such as the development 
of infrastructure (roads across forests) or the expansion of cash crops at the expenses of forest 
land. In such case, the indirect impact of North-South transfers might be an acceleration of 
deforestation  in  the  medium  and  long  term,  annihilating  short  term  efforts  to  avoid 
deforestation, that have to be demonstrated by countries in order to become eligible.  
Table 1: Direct and indirect impacts of international instruments 
International policies  Direct impact expected  Indirect economic 
impact expected 
Effect on 
deforestation? Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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Given  the  range  of  international  policy  instruments  tabled  in  current  international 
negotiations, there is a need for a better assessment of their direct and indirect impacts on the 
drivers of deforestation. Most economic models of deforestation try to identify drivers of 
deforestation  to  explain  the  growing  pressure  on  forest  cover  (Kaimowitz  and  Angelsen, 
1998).  However,  few  econometric  studies  have  attempted  to  link  their  conclusions  with 
international policies.  
2.3.  Deforestation patterns and relative forest endowment 
Another issue at stake in current multilateral negotiations on forest is the need to better tailor 
international policy instruments to the diversity of so-called “national circumstances”. All 
tropical countries obviously do not have the same past rate of deforestation nor the same need 
for future economic and demographic development. It is common knowledge that one-size-
fits-all solutions are inappropriate because deforestation drivers vary by country and region. 
On the other hand, although domestic policy options to reduce deforestation can vary, there is 
a real need to design the most inclusive international scheme as it is the best insurance against 
leakage.  
Our objective was thus not to identify the best policy option for each country but rather to 
analyze whether it would be useful to design better-adjusted international instrument packages 
for different types of deforesting countries. To this end, we conducted a country-level panel 
data  analysis  linking  the  rate  of  forest  area  (capturing  the  deforestation  phenomenon)  to 
variables that measure the direct and indirect effects of international instruments. 
Most econometric analyses of deforestation conduct pooled estimations (Combes Motel et al., 
2009; Allen and Barnes, 1997; Shandra and al, 2008; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004) or cluster 
estimations by continents (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; Koop and Tole, 1999; Bhattarai and 
Hammig,  2001;  Culas,  2007).  Bhattarai  and  Hammig  (2001)  justify  the  choice  of  the 
continent division claiming that a continent “provides a comparable set of environmental and Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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economic  conditions  across  a  wide  geographic  area”.  However,  climate  or  geographic 
location and characteristics can be captured through a fixed-effect panel-data model, and it 
would be inaccurate to argue that the response of countries to the deforestation drivers will be 
the  same  among  countries  just  because  they  belong  to  the  same  continent.  Moreover, 
segmentation by continent does not take the “forest transition” phenomenon into account, 
which is essential in understanding deforestation dynamics. Forest transition theory argues 
that it is unlikely that massive deforestation will be maintained over time, as the opportunity 
costs of deforestation increase with increased forest scarcity (Ewers, 2005; Karsenty, 2008; 
Damette and Delacote, 2008). Rudel et al. (2005) argue that the feeling of forest scarcity 
reduces incentives to deforest and can even lead to reforestation, as in China or India. In 
contrast, Brazil, Cameroon and Indonesia continue to deforest because of the abundance of 
their forests. We therefore chose to estimate three models for three average levels of forest 
endowment. We stick to the clustering chosen by FAO: countries with low forest endowment
5 
with 10 to 30% of forest cover (LE group), medium endowment countries i.e. 30 to 50% of 
forest cover (ME) and countries with high forest endowment i.e. more t han 50% of forest 
cover (HE). The HE group corresponds to the pooling of two FAO categories, in order to have 
approximately the same number of countries in each group. 
3.  Data and model specifications 
3.1.  Econometric Model   
Early econometrics studies on drivers of deforestation were cross-sectional models, because 
insufficient  data  was  available  for  time-series  analysis  (Kaimowitz  and  Angelsen,  1998). 
Koop and Tole (1999) underlined that a robust analysis of deforestation required panel data 
analysis. More recent studies therefore mobilized panel data (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; 
Koop and Tole, 1999; Culas, 2007; Combes Motel et al., 2009). Except for Shandra et al. 
(2008) and Combes Motel et al. (2009), who used recent data, all other available studies are 
based on fifteen-year-old data sets, thus limiting their interpretative powers for recent years 
during which the international context has changed quite dramatically. 
Our contribution is to use a recent data base covering the period from 1990 to 2005: it is one 
of the first econometric analyses to capture deforestation dynamics during the 2000s. All 
developing  countries  with  more  than  10%  of  forest  cover  are  included,  except  for  four 
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countries with an incomplete data set
6. Equatorial Guinea was also excluded from the sample 
as an outlier because its income per capita is three times the average. Our panel data (table 2) 
includes a sample of 56 countries divided into three sub -samples based on their initial forest 
endowment relative to their total area. There are 16 countries in the LE group, 18 countries in 
the ME group and 22 in the HE group. We conducted a Chow test to compare the pooled 
model (56 countries) with the same model estimated for the three separate samples (HE, ME 
and LE): the F-statistics is equal to 32.62 above the F-value of 2.43, therefore the coefficients 
obtained by grouping countries according to their relative forest endowment was significantly 
different from those in pooled model.  
Table 2 – 56 countries included in the model, by continent and by endowment group 
Low forest endowment (LE)  Medium forest endowment (ME)  High forest endowment (HE) 
16 countries   18 countries  22 countries 
Latina America  
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Lao, People's Dem. Rep. 
Malaysia 
Papua New Guinea 
The best data on natural forest cover
7 are collected by the World Resources Institute but are 
unfortunately only available for three years (1980, 1990 and 1995) (Bhattarai and  Hammig, 
2004). The FAO provides data on forests and woodlands, with natural and planted trees, 
including land cover that has been cleared but that will be reforested in the near future. Only 
forest plots whose area exceeds 0.5 hectare and whose canopy cove rs at least 10% of the 
surface area are included. We used the forest cover data from the 2005 FAO Forest Resources 
Assessments (FRA). This new data base is much more reliable than the previous FAO data 
                                                 
6 Botswana (LE country), Liberia (ME country), Myanmar (HE country) and Suriname (HE country) 
7 this is the natural forest cover observed by the Landsat satellite, later verified using GIS and field observations 
and compiled by the Global Environmental Monitoring Systems (GEMS) and FAO. Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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base (FAO FRA of 1980 and 1990 used in the majority of previous studies) based on old 
inventories and extrapolated from a single data point with a deforestation model that only 
depended on population growth.  The 2005 FAO FRA contains  information collated from 
more  countries  and  territories  (229)  for  three  points  in  time  (1990,  2000  and  2005)  and 
improved by the use of satellite images, “regular contact, expert consultations, training for 
national correspondents and ten regional and sub-regional workshops” (FAO, 2005).  
We can therefore reasonably assume that the 2005 FAO FRA is the best international data set 
available. We used the relative forest endowment of each country as our dependent variable. 
This corresponds to the percentage of the total area of the country under forest. We tested 
several  specifications  for  the  model  and  the  most  satisfactory  one  was  the  log-log 
specification. It enables us to interpret estimated coefficient as elasticities. 
    u X farea it
K
k
kit k i it Log Log    
1   
Where i =1,...,N countries and t =1,...,15 periods; fareai,t is the dependant variable; αi is the 
intercept term for country i; βk, k=1,...,K are the coefficients to be estimated for the K 
explanatory variables (table 3)
8.  
The F-test shows the rejection of the simple pooled regression for a panel specification.  A 
Hausman test applied to all samples allowed us to accept the fixed effect model at a risk of 
5%. The Breush-Pagan test confirmed the existence of heteroskedasticity in our model. The 
model was thus estimated by fixed-effect formulation with correction for heteroskedasticity 
using the Eicker-White matrix. 
We distinguished two types of explanatory variables: the first set of variables captures the 
effects of deforestation drivers, mainly competition for land; the second set of variables is 
included to measure the indirect impact of international policy instruments.  
Descriptive  statistics  of  regression  variables  are  presented  in  appendix  1.  The  highest 
deforestation rate was observed in the ME country group. It is worth noting that the LE group 
had  a  positive  reforestation  rate  during  the  study  period.  This  is  due  to  reforestation  in 
countries like China, India, Chile, Swaziland and Vietnam. However, when China was left out 
of the sample, the average forest area in the LE group declined. In the ME group, the Ivory 
Coast also reforested steadily over the 15 years of the study period and Costa Rica started 
                                                 
8 We obtained the same regression result (except for the estimated intercept value) when we used the forested 
area as dependent variable instead of the relative forest endowment ( due to the log-log specification). Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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reforestation in 2001; in the HE group, Guyana and Belize had a rate of deforestation close to 
0. 
Table 3 Definition and description of explanatory variables 
3.2.  Explanatory variables 
3.2.1.  Deforestation drivers: competition for land 
Population  pressure  and  poverty  are  considered  to  be  one  of  the  main  drivers  of 
environmental  degradation.  This  hypothesis  is  supported  by  the  neo-Malthusian  theory 
(Shandra et al., 2008; Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004). Population 
grows more rapidly than means of subsistence, and people consequently look for new areas in 
which they can respond to the increasing needs in food and fuelwood. Shandra et al. (2008) 
point to the role of growing populations of small-scale farmers and shifting cultivators in the 
sharp increase in deforestation. In Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) and Shandra et al. (2008), 
the population growth rate and rural density are included in a deforestation model. Their 
results  show  that  rural  population  pressure  -  and  not  overall  population  growth  -  is  a 
significant factor contributing to deforestation. This is a result found also by Barbier and 
Burgess  (1997),  Combes  Motel  et  al.  (2009),  and  Cropper  and  Griffiths  (1994)  only  for 
Africa. Consequently, we included rural population as an explanatory variable in our model. 
Forest cover is threatened by agricultural expansion, wood extraction (fuelwood, commercial, 
charcoal etc.) and the extension of infrastructure (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). Incentives 
to clear forest for conversion to agriculture are measured in existing econometric models of 

























Rural population  POPRUR  Rural population/total population   FAO  Negative 
Export  value  of  forest 
products 
XFOR  Current millions $US  FAO  Negative 
Export value of 
agricultural products 
XVAL  Current billions $US  FAO  Negative 
Agricultural added value  AGVAL  Current  1 000$US  per  square 
kilometers 


























































GDPC²  Positive 
External debt, total  DEBT  Current million $US  WB  Negative 
Terrestrial areas protected  PA  Terrestrial areas protected/ total 
area per country 
United 
Nations 
Positive Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
12 
 
deforestation  by  proxies  of  agriculture  profitability  such  as  exports  of  agricultural 
commodities (Culas, 2007; Combes Motel at al., 2009), instability of agricultural commodity 
export  unit  value  (Combes  Motel  et  al.,  2009),  agricultural  value  added  (Bhattarai  and 
Hammig,  2004)  or  average  farm  yield.  Bhattarai  and  Hammig  (2004)  found  that 
improvements  in  agricultural  productivity  reduced  the  pressure  to  convert  forestland  to 
agricultural use. Combes Motel et al. (2009) showed that the higher the price of agricultural 
commodities,  the  higher  the  deforestation  rate.  When  prices  subsequently  decreased,  the 
deforestation rate nevertheless remained high. The links between agricultural productivity and 
deforestation are not easily disentangled. Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001) devoted an entire 
book to measuring how technological change in agriculture can affect tropical forest cover. 
According to these authors, there are two broad responses: on the one hand, a „win-win‟ 
situation where, at the macro-scale, the increase in agricultural  yields leads to “economic 
development  and  growth,  which,  in  turn,  is  associated  with  other  changes  that  limit 
deforestation” and, at the micro-scale, technological change enables intensification rather than 
expansion of arable land. On the other hand, there is a „win-lose‟ situation if farmers are 
encouraged to “cultivate more land since farming has become profitable”. To measure the 
competition between agriculture and forest, we introduced two variables in our model: the 
added value per square kilometer generated by the agricultural sector; and the export value of 
agricultural commodities. The second variable enabled us to measure deforestation due to 
forests conversion for export agricultural products.  
Wood  extraction  pressure  is  usually  measured  by  roundwood  production  (Barbier  and 
Burgess, 1997) or by the price of tropical logs (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994, who found a 
positive  relationship  between  the  price  of  tropical  logs  and  deforestation  only  in  Latin 
America). We used the export value of timber products
9, which provides an estimation of the 
revenues generated by logging. It is obvious that this variable is insufficient because it does 
not measure illegal logging
10 nor the volume of trees harvested for fuelwood but it is the best 
available estimator for wood extraction incentives.  
The causality relationship between export values of forest and agricultural products and 
deforestation can be ambiguous since export values can also be explained by deforestation. To 
                                                 
9 Timber products cover roundwood, fuelwood and charcoal, industrial roundwood, sawnwood,  wood-based 
panels, pulp, paper and paperboard (FAO website) 
10 The FAO (2005) reported that in most of countries where illegal logging occurs, the volume of illegally 
harvested timber exceeds the amount of official annual timber harvested.  In this way, we can postulate that 
illegal logging strengthens the impact of the correlation between rate of deforestation and the value of exports of 
forestry products. Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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avoid this endogeneity issue, we introduced a one-year lag for these two variables in our 
model.  
Several  authors  have  demonstrated  that  the  quality  and  the  robustness  of  institutions  (in 
particular security in property rights) can contribute to a reduction in deforestation behaviour 
and ensure more sustainable forest management (Culas, 2007; Bhattarai and Hamming, 2004; 
Deacon,  1994).  Following  Bhattarai  and  Hamming  (2004),  in  our  model  we  added  two 
additional  explanatory  variables,  a  political  rights  index  and  civil  liberties  index,  both 
obtained from the Freedom House database. However, these variables were not significant, 
probably because they are too broad in scope to adequately capture the complex issue of 
collective rights that often prevail in forests. We therefore decided ultimately to drop these 
variables from our model.  
3.2.2.  Explanatory variables with likely feedback effects on deforestation process 
3.2.2.1.  National income 
One of the main findings of most studies is the correlation between economic growth and the 
rate of deforestation, confirming the general empirical result of the environmental Kuznets 
curve  (EKC):  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  environmental  degradation  and 
economic growth. Cropper and Griffiths (1994) and Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) obtained a 
hump-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and rate of deforestation in Africa and in 
Latin America, while Koop and Tole (1999) observed an EKC for deforestation only in Asia 
and Africa. The only two studies where a pooled sample was used (Combes Motel et al., 
2009; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004), confirmed the existence of an EKC relationship. 
The general explanations are that low-income countries clear forests to increase arable area 
and fuelwood. Higher levels of income are often associated with greater rural density, which 
in turn accelerates the pace of deforestation. However, beyond a given level of income (the 
so-called  “turning  point”),  deforestation  starts  declining:  higher  income  enables  technical 
change and modernization of agriculture and makes investments in industrial activities more 
profitable. It relieves the pressure on forest (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001). Food and energy 
consumption  also  changes:  “fuelwood  energy  predominates  during  early  stages  of 
development but coal and petroleum-based fuels become more important during later stages, 
thereby reducing further forest conversion pressure” (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004). Finally, 
the wealthiest countries start investing in the protection of biodiversity and natural resources 
because there is greater demand for environmental services and amenities (Mills, 2009). Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
14 
 
 To test the EKC hypothesis for forest, we expect a negative coefficient for the GDP per 
capita  term,  while  we  introduce  a  quadratic  income  term  that  should  have  a  positive 
coefficient in the regression model.‟ 
3.2.2.2.  Debt  
We introduced a variable measuring the need to earn foreign exchange in order to repay debt. 
Total  external  debt  may  be  an  explanatory  variable  of  deforestation,  because  developing 
countries often rely on “the export of whatever available natural resources may be in demand 
on the world market” (Shandra et al., 2008) to pay back their international debt. We expected 
a negative sign for the correlation between debt and deforestation, thus supporting the synergy 
effect of debt-for-nature swaps. Kahn and McDonald (1995), Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) 
found that debt is one of the main factors leading to excessive deforestation, and confirmed 
the importance of debt management in the tropical deforestation process. 
3.2.2.3.  Protected areas 
To the previous macroeconomic variables, we added a variable measuring the total terrestrial 
protected area. These are areas of land especially dedicated to the preservation of biodiversity. 
In  2008,  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  counted  about  17  million
11  square 
kilometers of marine or terrestrial protected areas, of which 12.4% are forests
12. We used the 
database  built  by  the  UN  data  for  Millennium  Development  Goals
13  to  measure  the  
consequence of the establishment of protected areas on deforestation rates. Although we 
intuitively expected a positive correlation between forest area and protected area, we wanted 
to check whether leakage issues within countries might in fact increase t he net rate of 
deforestation by intensifying deforesting activities outside the conservation area. 
4.  Results and policy recommendations 
4.1.  Regression results 
Results of estimations are shown in table 4 for the whole sample (pooled results) and for the 
three groups: LE, ME and HE. For the four regressions, the within R² was between 0.24 and 
0.62, confirming the reasonably good explanatory power of our model. Splitting the pooled 
                                                 
11 equivalent to 4% of the total area in the world 
12 http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/forest/fp_our_work/fp_our_work_oaw/fp_our_work_fpa/  
13 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx  Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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sample into three country groups according to forest endowment improved the significance of 
explanatory variables
14.  
Results shown in table 4 enabled us to evaluate the possible complementary or substitution 
effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation. We observed that indirect 
unforeseen  effects  vary  across  the  thr ee  groups.  This  analysis  helped  us  formulate 
recommendations for differentiated policies designed to address the specificities of each 
country group.  
Almost all estimated parameters were statistically significant in the LE and ME groups, 
whereas the picture that emerged for the HE group was less clear, as few variables were 
significant. We tested various model specifications and several other explanatory variables 
but, whatever the model used, we were unable to identify a better model. It seems that the 
deforestation trend in the HE group is relatively independent of changes in deforestation 
drivers. Our hypothesis to explain this surprising result is that the high relative endowment in 
forest locks this group in a development path that is largely supported  by the exploitation of 
forest  resources  or  the  conversion  of  forests  into  farmland,  without  enough  economic 
alternatives to enable the country to switch to a different development pattern. Consequently, 
except  for  debt  relief policies, these  countries  are   relatively  insensitive to  international 
incentives. 
Another general result is that greater indebtedness in all country groups leads to more 
deforestation, according to the negative and statistically significant estimation parameter of 
variable DEBT. As already stated in the discussion on model variables, indebted countries are 
tempted to repay their debt by increasing the export earnings of agricultural and forest 
products. The forest-debt elasticity is  –0.040 in the LE group while it is –0.075 in the ME 
group, demonstrating that international debt alleviation can be a truly effective international 
policy to curb global deforestation. 
                                                 
14 The model for LE group was also estimated without China and India to control for possible size effects. Since 





































































































N  837  237  270  330 
R²  0.28  0.47  0.62  0.24 
T statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
4.2.  Results and policy recommendations for countries in the low endowment group 
The  coefficient  of  GDP  per  capita  is  positive  and  statistically  significant,  although  the 
quadratic term is not. In this group, an increase in income reduces the pressure on forest 
cover: an increase of 10% in GDP per capita can lead to an average increase in forest area of 
1.1%.  Consequently,  favoring  economic  growth  should  indirectly  contribute  to  forest 
protection. This result, which concerns a group of countries in which the average GDP per 
capita is very low (1147 $/capita) contradicts the EKC hypothesis of an initial degradation of 
natural resources with an increase in income. Some countries in the LE group already have a 
clear reforestation policy. This result indicates that the REDD mechanism, be it output-based 
payments  or  input-based  payments,  will  be  effective  by  helping  to  increase  the  national 
income of recipient countries.  
The  deforestation  rate  in  the  LE  group  appears  to  be  mainly  driven  by  rural  population 
pressure  (which  increases  demand  for  fuelwood)  and  gains  in  agricultural  productivity: 
competition between forest and agricultural lands concerns staple crops more than export 
crops (the parameter for XAG is not significant). 
Protected area policies have a positive and strong impact on forests with a forest-protected 
area average elasticity of 0.25. One of the first explanations is that the priority in LE countries Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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is protection of the forest since forests are already scarce. For instance, out of the 78 protected 
areas in Burkina Faso, 63 are dedicated to forests
15. The second reason is that it is easier to 
create alternative activities for people who are forbidden to exploit protected forest areas, and 
the issue of leakage is therefore less crucial than in other groups. Domestic or international 
policies against deforestation should therefore focus on offering alternatives for fuelwood to 
rural populations, favor the intensification of food crops to spare forest land and promote  the 
establishment of forest protected areas. The REDD program can be expected to be very 
effective, whether implemented at the national level or at the project level. 
4.3.  Results and policy recommendations for countries in the medium endowment 
group 
The ME group is the only group in which we confirmed the environmental Kuznets curve for 
deforestation,  with  highly  significant  estimated  parameters  both  for  GDPC  and  GDPC 
squared. This indicates that the rate of forest area in the LE group first declines when GDP 
per  capita  increases,  then,  for  higher  levels  of  income,  beyond  a  turning  point,  the 
deforestation rate diminishes. This result at least partially confirms the results of other studies 
(Combes Motel and al., 2009; Bhattarai and al., 2004; Culas 2007; Cropper and Griffiths, 
1994). 
Lind and Melhum (2007) argue that a significant quadratic term is not sufficient to confirm 
the non-linear effect. The turning point must be contained in the data range and tests on slopes 
at the beginning and the ending of the interval must confirm the U-shape (Couttenier, 2008). 
We ran the U-shape test proposed by Lind and Melhum, (2007) based on a Sasabuchi test 
(Couttenier, 2008). Results are given in table 5.  
Table 5 - Test for U-Shape (Lind and Melhum (2007)) 
Log(GDP)  ME countries 
Interval  [-2.130; 2.008] 
Slope at Lower Bound  -0.164 
Slope at Upper Bound  -0.0149 
Sasabuchi test for U-shaped  Extremum outside the interval 
Turning Point   2.420 
95% confidence interval for extreme point (Fieller method)  [1.152; 6.290] 
The turning point is outside the interval, corresponding to a GDP per capita of US$ 11 250 (in 
2005, the higher GDP per capita in the ME group is at $US 7450 for Mexico). A GDP per 
capita of US$ 11 250 is plausible
16 but it is unlikely that one of the ME countries will reach it 
                                                 
15 http://bch-cbd.naturalsciences.be/burkina/bf-eng/index.htm 
16 It is the GDP per capita of South Africa in 2008 Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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in the near future. Therefore since GDP growth accelerates deforestation in ME countries, a 
REDD program with output-based payments is preferable to a REDD program with input-
based  payments,  i.e.  payments  should  be  made  only  on  the  basis  of  certified  avoided 
deforestation. To avoid the issue of non permanence, the international community will have to 
be particularly cautious either by deferring part of the payment over the longer term or by re-
imposing strict deforestation conditions for the next period payments.  
We observed that the deforestation rate in ME countries is worsened by rural population 
pressure,  as  in  the  LE  group.  However,  competition  between  forest  conservation  and  the 
temptation to increase agricultural and forestry products exports is significant. Consequently 
sustainable forest management and certification of agricultural products are essential policies 
to reduce deforestation. 
In this group, as in the HE group, we observe a surprising negative elasticity between the 
forest cover rate and protected area (- 0.29). This result can be explained by the phenomenon 
of  internal  leakage:  the  creation  of  a  new  forest  conservation  area  leads  to  intensified 
extraction in neighboring areas, mainly because forest users are driven out of their traditional 
area of activity without sufficient monetary compensation or economic alternatives. Their 
only option is thus to start deforesting unprotected areas, often at a greater rate to generate 
more revenue and to be able to re-invest.  The establishment of forest conversion areas must 
therefore  be  implemented  with  careful  accompanying  measures  and  adequate  local 
development projects.  
5.  Conclusion 
Our  results  confirm  that  deforestation  patterns  are  strongly  related  to  forest  endowment: 
indeed, we demonstrate that drivers of deforestation do not have the same impact –in sign and 
intensity  –  in  highly  forested  countries  as  in  countries  with  a  low  percentage  of  forests. 
Although this has often been reported in qualitative analysis of deforestation dynamics, this is 
the first econometric analysis to confirm this intuition with a full panel of tropical countries. 
Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution since they only capture average 
trends and use an imperfect database. 
Our  analysis  provides  a  better  understanding  of  the  drivers  of  deforestation  at  the 
macroeconomic level, and should help draw up policy recommendations for the design of 
international policy instruments. Synergy effects of international policy instruments to reduce deforestation S. Leplay  and S. Thoyer  
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We illustrate that beyond the outcomes resulting of the conditionality of policy instruments 
(direct  impact),  feedback  effects  on  deforestation  occur  through  changes  in  deforestation 
drivers.  Some  international  policy  instruments  are  better  suited  for  particular  groups  of 
countries, while other instruments should be avoided in certain countries. Debt relief policy is 
effective in all three groups. In the low endowment group, an efficient policy package should 
include the expansion of protected forests, intensification of staple food production, and the 
setting  up  of  a  REDD  mechanism.  The  package  differs  from  that  recommended  for  the 
medium endowment group where the REDD mechanism should favor output-based payments, 
and  should  avoid  project-level  implementation  to  contain  leakage;  and  forest  stewardship 
certification should be encouraged and subsidized. International policy instruments would be 
less effective –at least in the short term – for the high endowment group. This pleads in favor 
of longer term solutions involving long-term conditional financing commitments between the 
international community and these particular deforesting countries. 
Ideally, policy interventions to curb deforestation should be tailored to local specificities but 
there is a risk that favoring small-scale projects will not create the necessary impetus by the 
international community to come to grips with the deforestation problem. There is therefore a 
true value added in  a collective international  effort,  even if it results  in  imperfect  policy 
instruments. Our work should help improve the fit between international policies and the 
needs of groups of countries by taking into account the “national circumstances” as advised in 
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Appendix 1 – Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 




Mean  41.32  20.61  38.05  59.06 
S.D.  18.19  6.90   8.15   10.85  
Min  6.79  6.79  23.13   27.35 
Max  81.91  38.98  61.20  81.92 
Deforestation rate  Mean  0.00755  0.00621  0.0104  0.00620 
S.D.  0.0104  0.0154  0.00735   0.00680 
Min  -0.0258  -0.0258  -0.00149   0 




Mean  15.66  9.48  18.45   17.87 
S.D.  12.29  8.012  8.68  15.43  
Min  0.0049  0.0049  2.59  0.75 
Max  71.34  26.09  38.36  71.35 
GDPC 
(Current 1 000$US) 
Mean  1.342  1.147   1.171  1.624  
S.D.  1.559  1.799   1.327   1.506  
Min  0.0849  0.0978   0.119  0.0849  
Max  8.281  8.281  7.447  6.714 
GDPC²  Mean  4.227  4.543  3.124   4.900  
S.D.  9.330  12.651   7.396   7.710  
Min  0.00721  0.00956  0.0141   0.00721  




Mean  .0412  0.0619  0.0562762  0.0137 
S.D.  0.0517  0.0628  0.0558  0.0126 
Min  0.000792  0.00120  0.00305  0.000792  
Max  0.247  0.246  0.247  0.0619 
VAAG 
(Current 1 000$US 
per square 
kilometers) 
Mean  32.267  25.230   40.967  30.268 
S.D.  35.6103  25.908  38.635   37.723  
Min  0.470  1.440  0.470  1.538 




Mean  1766.035  2 315.78  1 721.022   1 403.05  
S.D.  3530.229  4 188.948  2 506.939   3 679.21  
Min  1.156  26.075  1.156   3.35 




Mean  353.3244  349.465  351.330   357.762  
S.D.  990.3407  964.964  1 090.171   923.336  
Min  0  0   0.01   0.004  





Mean  24 273.44  30 398.33  26 537.23  17 966.78  
S.D.  44 333.47  48 861.97   43 744.04   40 509.8  
Min  142.733  259.561   698.507  142.733  
Max  281 612.1  281 612.1  171 161.7  244 107.7 
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